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Much contemporary philosophy of language has shown considerable interest in the relation 
between our linguistic practice and our metaphysical commitments, and this interest has begun to 
influence work in the history o f philosophy as well.1 In his Categories and De interpntatione, Aristotle 
presents an analysis of language that can be read as intended to illustrate an isomorphism between 
the ontology of the real world and how we talk about that world. Our understanding of language is 
at least in part dependent upon our understanding of the relationships that exist among the endur­
ing πράγματα that we come across in our daily experience. Part of the foundations underlying Ar­
istotle’s doctrine o f categories seems to have been a concern, going back to the Academy, about the 
problem of false propositions: language is supposed to be a tool for communicating the way things 
are, and writers in antiquity were often puzzled by the problem of how we are to understand pro­
positions that claim that reality is other than it is.2 Aristotle’s analysis of propositions raises a par­
ticular problem in this regard: if the subject of a proposition does not refer to anything how can 
the proposition be useful for talking about a state of the world? The problem falls into two separate 
but related parts: propositions whose subjects are singular terms and hence make claims about some 
particular thing and propositions whose subjects are general terms and hence make claims about 
classes. In this paper I will explain Aristotle’s treatment o f each kind, focusing in particular on what 
has widely been perceived as a problem in his treatment o f singular terms. My discussion o f his 
treatment o f general terms will be more brief, but will show that his treatment o f them is consistent 
with his treatment of singular terms.
1. Singular terms
In a paper that he called his finest philosophical essay,3 Bertrand Russell maintained that 
definite descriptions make implicit existence claims. For example, Russell claims that the sentence 
“The king of France is bald” tacitly says that there is some person who is presently the king o f 
France. This is usually given in symbols as:
[1] (3>r) { {Kx & (y)[K y id  (x  =  j/)]}  & Bx}
where K — “is the king of France” and B = “is bald”. Since there is, in fact, no king of France at 
present (pardon my Republican prejudice), this sentence is false; hence, if this is how sentences 
containing definite descriptions are to be handled, any sentence containing a definite description as 
subject will be false if there is no entity fitting the definite description. This result can be seen most
1 An interesting treatment o f this topic that illustrates how such concerns intersect with issues in the history o f  
philosophy can be found in Cora Diam ond, The Realistic Spirit Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the M ind (Cambridge, M A  
MIT Press, 1996), Introduction II (pp. 13-38). C. W. A  Whittaker, Aristotle’s D e interpretatione: Contradiction and 
Dialectic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), also touches on these themes.
2 On the treatment by ancient philosophers o f the problem o f falsehood see Nicholas Denyer, Language, Thought and 
Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1991).
3 Bertrand Russell, “On denoting”, in Robert Charles March , ed.. Logic and Knowledge (London: Unwin Hyman 
1905), pp. 41-56.
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clearly when we remember that one o f the ways of reading the existential quantifier is: “There is 
some X such that..
Aristotle appears to have held a similar doctrine, though he does not enunciate it in terms 
of definite descriptions. Instead he makes the following claim: any sentence that ascribes a property 
to some subject entails that the subject o f that sentence exists. This can be given in symbols as:
[2] Fa ZD (3x) (x = a)
This doctrine is most clearly stated at the end of the tenth chapter o f the Categories (13M2-35; I 
quote this passage in extenso because o f its importance to the argument o f this paper; to facilitate 
referencing between the Greek and English I have underscored certain passages in the Greek and 
their English equivalents in the translation):4
ού μην άλλα  μάλιστα  δόξειεν άν το τοιοΰτο συμβαίνειν έπ ί των κα τά  
συμπλοκήν έναντίων λεγομένων, —το γάρ ύγια ίνε ιν  Σωκράτη τω νοσειν 
Σωκράτη έναντίον έστίν,—  άλλ’ ούδ’ έπ ί τούτων άναγκαίον ά ε ί θάτερον 
μέν άληθές θάτερον δέ ψεύδος είναι* οντος μέν νάρ Σωκράτους εσ τα ι τό 
μεν άληθές το δέ ψεύδος, μή οντος δέ άμφότερα ψευδή* ούτε γάρ το νοσειν 
Σωκράτη ούτε τό ύγια ίνε ιν  άληθές αυτού μή οντος δλως τού Σωκράτους. 
έπι δέ τής στερήσεως κα ι τής εξεως μή οντος γε δλως ουδέτερον άληθές, 
οντος δέ ούκ άεί θάτερον άληθές* τό γάρ όψ ιν εχε ιν  Σωκράτη τω τυφλόν 
ε ίνα ι Σωκράτη άντίκειτα ι ώς στέρησις κ α ι έξις, κα ι οντος γε ούκ 
άναγκαίον θάτερον άληθές ε ίνα ι ή ψεύδος, — δτε γάρ μήπω πέφυκεν εχειν , 
άμφότερα ψευδή,—  μή οντος δέ δλως τού Σωκράτους κ α ι ούτω ψευδή 
άμφότερα, κα ι τό δψ ιν αυτόν εχειν  κα ι τό τυφλόν είνα ι, έπ ι δέ γε τής 
καταφάσεως κα ί τής άποφάσεως άεί, έάν τε ή έάν τε μή ή, τό μέν ετερον 
εστα ι ψεύδος τό δέ ετερον άληθές* τό γάρ νοσειν Σωκράτη κα ι τό μή 
νοσειν Σωκράτη, οντος τε αύτού φανερόν δτι τό ετερον αύτών άληθές ή 
ψεύδος, κα ι μή οντος ομοίως* τό μέν γάρ νοσειν μή οντος ψεύδος, τό δέ μή 
νοσειν άληθές* ώστε έπ ί μόνων τούτων ίδ ιον άν είη  τό ά ε ί θάτερον αύτών 
άληθές ή ψεύδος είνα ι, δσα ώς κατάφασις κ α ί άπόφασις άντίκειτα ι.
It might, indeed, very well seem that the same sort o f thing does occur in the case o f 
contraries said with combination, ‘Socrates is well’ being contrary to ‘Socrates is sick’.
Yet not even with these is it necessary always for one to be true and the other false.
For if Socrates exists one will be true and one false, but if he does not both will be 
false; neither ‘Socrates is sick’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ will be true if Socrates himself 
does not exist at all. As for possession and privation, if he does not exist at all nei­
ther is true, while not always one or the other is true if he does. For ‘Socrates has 
sight’ is opposed to ‘Socrates is blind’ as possession to privation; and if he exists it is 
not necessary for one or the other to be true or false (since until the time when it is 
natural for him to have it both are false), while if Socrates does not exist at all then 
again both are false, both h e  has sight’ and h e  is blind’. But with an affirmation and 
negation one will always be false and the other true whether he exists or not. For 
take ‘Socrates is sick’ and ‘Socrates is not sick’: if he exists it is clear that one or the 
other o f them will be true or false, and equally if he does not: for if he does not exist
4 The Greek text cited throughout is that o f  M inio-Paluello’s OCT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949). A ll
translations, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from John L. Ackrill, Aristotle’s  Categories and D e interpretatione 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1963), since that translation represents what I w ill shortly call the received view.
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Tie is sick’ is false but lie  is not sick’ true. Thus it would be distinctive o f these 
alone— opposed affirmations and negations—that always one or the other o f them 
is true or false.
The most common interpretation of this passage—which I will call the received view— 
takes Aristotle to be saying the following three things. First, some affirmations affirm predicates 
that are contrary in nature, e.g. “is sick” and “is well”. When these affirmations are made of a sub­
ject that exists, one is true and the other false, but if they are made of a subject that does not exist, 
then they are both false. Second, some affirmations affirm predicates that are not contradictory but 
that are nevertheless opposed to one another as possession to privation, e.g. “has sight” and “is 
blind”. When these affirmations are made of a subject that exists, it is not necessary that one be 
true and the other be false, since both may be false; it is not possible that both be true, however, 
and if the subject does not exist, then necessarily both are false. Third, when statements are op­
posed as affirmation to negation, then necessarily one of them will be true and the other false re­
gardless of whether the subject exists or not. The reason is that the denial will be true whenever the 
subject does not exist (if something does not exist, then it has no properties at all, so it will be true 
to say, with respect to some particular property, that the non-existent thing does not have it), but 
the affirmation will be false because of existential import; and if the subject does exist then the two 
statements are a variation of the case o f affirmations of contradictory properties, and one must be 
true and the other false. The received view is summarized in the following table:
Subject exists Subject does not exist
Contradictory assertions (Fa, 
Ga, where G contradicts 
sense o f F)
Necessarily, one false and 
the other true Necessarily, both false
Possession vs. privation (Fa, 
Ga, where G is the privation 
of F)
One false and one true, or 
both false
Necessarily, both false
Assertions vs. denials (Fa, 
~Fa)
Necessarily, one false and 
the other true
Necessarily, one false and 
the other true
Most commentators,5 however, think that this passage from the Categories is at odds with 
what Aristotle says in De interpretaüone 11 21a25-28):
ώσπερ 'Όμηρός έστί τι, oîjov ποιητής* αρ’ obv κα ι εστιν, ή οΰ; κατά  
συμβεβηκός γαρ κατηγορείται τό εστιν του 'Ομήρου* ότι γάρ ποιητής εστιν, 
άλλ’ ου καθ’ αυτό, κατηγορείται κατά  του 'Ομήρου το εστιν.
5 In particular see Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and D e interpretatione, Eugene B abin, The Theory of Opporition in 
Aristotle (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1940), Russell M. Dancy , Sense and Contradiction: A  Study 
in Aristotle (Dordrecht, 1975), Manley Thom pson, “On Aristotle’s square o f  opposition”, in  J. Μ. E . M oravcsik, 
ed., Aristotle (Garden City, N Y , 1967), pp. 55-57, Nicholas White , “Origins o f  Aristotle’s essentialism ”, Temew of 
Metaphysics 2β (1973), 62-72.
Carson 4
For example, Homer is something (say, a poet). Does it follow that he is? No, for 
the ‘is’ is predicated accidentally o f Homer; for it is because he is a poet, not in its 
own right, that the ‘is’ is predicated o f Homer.
The received view reads this passage as assuming that the sentence “Homer is a poet” is true, but 
that “Homer is” nevertheless does not follow from i t  The problem is this. If  “Homer is a poet” is 
true, there must be someone named Homer who is a poet; but in this case to say that “Homer is” 
ought to be true as well. But if Homer is dead or otherwise does not exist (i.e., if it is not true to say 
that “Homer is”), how could “Homer is a poet” be true given what Aristotle has said in the Catego- 
nes? Has Aristotle contradicted himself? Most commentators think that he has. Later on I will sug­
gest a reading of the De interpretatione passage that does not attribute such a contradiction to Aris­
totle, but first I would like to underscore the metaphysical underpinnings of these passages by tak­
ing a close look at a rival interpretation by William Jacobs.6
According to Jacobs there is no real contradiction; what has been perceived as a contradic­
tion is really nothing more than an artifact of the received view’s translation o f the Categoúes pas­
sage. On Jacobs’ reading o f the passage, Aristotle is not claiming that an assertion is false if its sub­
ject does not exist. Jacobs claims that the genitives absolute (underlined in the Greek text and the 
English translation o f the Categoúes passage) that are traditionally translated as “if Socrates ex- 
ists/does not exist” should not be translated that way at all, but rather as “o f Socrates’ being”, 
where this is understood to refer to Socrates’ essence rather than his existence. Thus, when Aris­
totle says that neither “Socrates is sick” nor “Socrates is well” will be true if Socrates himself “is not 
at all”, according to Jacobs what he means is that if Socrates is not what he is—if he is not the sort 
of entity that his essence picks out, that is, a living being—then neither “sick” nor “well” can truly 
be predicated o f him. The reason for this, on Jacobs’ view, is that “sick” and “well” are predicates 
that can only be asserted o f living beings. The sentences “Socrates is sick” and “Socrates is well” 
will both be false not because there is no Socrates, but because we can no more predicate “sick” or 
“well” of something that is not a living thing than we can predicate “odd” or “even” o f something 
that is not a number. So on Jacobs’ account the Categoúes passage has nothing to do with existential 
import in singular sentences, and hence cannot be read as contradicting the De interpretatione ac­
count. Jacobs is not happy with the received view’s treatment of the De interpretatione passage either, 
but let me say a word about his analysis o f the Categoúes passage before turning to what he has to 
say about the De interpretatione.
His analysis rests on his interpretation of the genitives absolute, so it will be necessary to 
make something of a philological digression here. The genitive absolute, in Greek, bears a passing 
resemblance to what has sometimes been called the nominative absolute in English, but its usage is 
far more common. Briefly, the genitive absolute is a clause that stands grammatically apart from the 
rest of the sentence in which it occurs; normally it consists of a noun and a participle in the genitive 
case, though it may contain other words in other cases. Standardly the genitive absolute is used to 
convey information that is circumstantial to that o f the main clause, expressing either the time at 
which the main clause was true, the causes o f what is expressed in the main clause, the conditions 
under which the main clause is true, a concession that limits the sense o f the main clause, or the 
attendant circumstances of the main clause. Most of these categories are reducible to the last.7
Jacobs appears to be claiming that Socrates’ being what he is is part o f the attendant cir­
cumstances that would make assertions of his sickness or wellness true or false. But this would re-
6 William Jacobs, “Aristotle and Nonreferring Subjects”, Phronesis 24 (1979), 282-300.
7 For a full discussion o f  the nature and use o f  the genitive absolute, see Raphael Kühner and Bernhard Gerth, 
Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache (Hannover. Hahnsche, 1904), §485, especially pp. 78-79.
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quire that the Greek word ών, the present participle o f the verb “to be”, have the technical mean­
ing “essence”. This would be unusual for two reasons, one philological and the other philosophical. 
From a philological perspective such a usage is quite strange: if Jacobs is right, then this is the only 
place in all of Aristotle where a participle of the verb “to be” in a genitive absolute does not have a 
non-technical meaning like “to be” or “to exist”. As a matter of fact, it would probably be the only 
place in all of Greek literature where a genitive absolute consisting of a noun plus the present parti­
ciple of the verb “to be” would not be existential or copulative in meaning. In other words, what 
Jacobs is suggesting here would be a hapax kgomenon—a linguistic usage with no other attestation 
than the present passage. If, by some stretch of the imagination, Jacobs has indeed found a strange 
new use of the verb “to be” in a genitive absolute, we would have to find some way of squaring this 
usage with the fact that Aristotle uses the subjunctive of the verb to be in 13b28 to express the 
same idea that he is supposedly expressing with genitives absolute everywhere else; but I fear that 
the limits of credulity have already been reached.
The philosophical grounds for doubting Jacobs’ suggestion are just as telling. First o f all, it 
would be surprising to find Aristotle using the present participle of the verb “to be” in the technical 
meaning “essence”: Aristotle has other expressions for “essence”, none o f which involve the pres­
ent participle o f the verb “to be”. Second, if Aristotle were saying what Jacobs claims he is saying, it 
would be inconsistent with what Aristotle elsewhere has to say about essences. Jacobs translates our 
passage from the Categories as follows:
It might, indeed, very well seem that such happens [i.e. necessarily it will always be 
the case that one assertion will be true and the other assertion will be false] in the 
case o f those contraries said with combination— “Socrates is well” being contrary to 
“Socrates is sick”—but not even as concerns these is it necessary always for one to 
be true and the other to be false. For, on the one hand, o f Socrates’ being a living 
thing, one will be true and one will be false, while, on the other hand, o f Socrates’ 
not being a living thing, both will be false. For o f Socrates himself not being a living 
thing at all, neither “Socrates is sick” nor “Socrates is well” will be true.
Now, it is difficult to imagine what the phrase “of Socrates’ being a living thing, one will be true and 
one will be false” is supposed to mean. On the one hand, it might mean that “being sick” and 
“being well” can be predicated of Socrates’ essence, “being a living thing”— one truly and the other 
falsely. But one does not normally predicate such things o f an essence; indeed, according to Aris­
totle’s own doctrine, you cannot predicate anything of an essence except a higher genus, and it cer­
tainly is false to say that “being a living thing” is a species o f “being sick” or “being well”. On the 
other hand, it could mean that “being sick” or “being well” can be predicated truly or falsely o f the 
state of affairs represented by Socrates’ being a living thing—indeed this comes closest to picking 
out what a genitive absolute might have been intended to capture. But apart from the fact that it is 
highly unlikely—if not outright impossible—that this is what the Greek actually says, there is the 
fact that Aristotle does not normally express predications in this way. Normally when one thing is 
predicated of another Aristotle uses the verb κατηγορειν with the genitive; nowhere does he use a 
simple genitive with no verb of saying or asserting. If  Jacobs means that one sentence will be “true 
o f ’ Socrates’ being a living thing and the other “false o f ’ it, then again he has found a hapax legome- 
non, for there are no parallel passages o f this sort in Aristotle or any other writer. And regardless of 
how we are to interpret Jacobs here, we will be left wondering what to do with the word ολως, at 
13b20, which Jacobs does not bother to translate. It means “at all”, and makes perfectly good sense 
if the traditional reading is right in rendering the sentence “if Socrates does not exist at all’; but 
what does it mean to say “of Socrates’ not being a living thing at all”? To all o f this may be added
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the simple objection that if Socrates did exist he would be a living thing and thus both “sick” and 
“well” would be applicable to him even under Jacobs’ interpretation of the genitives absolute, hence 
even if Jacobs is going in the right direction by focusing in on Socrates’ essence, it is still the case 
that the truth or falsity of any assertion about his state o f health is inextricably connected to 
whether or not his essence is instantiated, i.e., whether or not he exists.
Finally, it is fair to ask why Jacobs’ reading should be preferred over the traditional one. 
There is nothing in particular about the passage in question to suggest that the traditional reading is 
impossible, and in light of the way in which Aristotle normally uses such genitives absolute, Jacobs’ 
interpretation begins to look a little ad hoc. Indeed, Jacobs’ only reason for claiming that the tradi­
tional interpretation is not possible is that it appears to leave Aristotle contradicting himself: he 
gives no philological reasons why the traditional reading cannot be right, nor does he offer any basis 
for thinking that his own reading is grammatically possible. In short, I suggest that Jacobs’ reading is 
insupportable.
As far as the passage from the De interpretatione is concerned, Jacobs is happy enough with 
the manner in which it has traditionally been translated, but he takes issue with what the received 
view takes to be the philosophical point at issue. According to Jacobs, Aristotle’s point in the De 
interpretatione passage is that the sentence “Homer is a poet” is a contingent truth; on his view, the 
passage has nothing to do with whether “Homer exists” is entailed by “Homer is a poet”, but rather 
is about how essential and accidental predicates are related to their subjects. For Jacobs, the ques­
tion “Is he or isn’t  he” o f 21a26 means “Is he, or is he not, a poet?” But this seems to me no t only 
to be an over-interpretation o f the passage, but to go so far as to ignore the force o f the word κ α ί 
at the start o f the question. The word κα ί is a conjunctive particle in Greek that is basically the 
equivalent o f the English conjunction “and”, but it often does a lot more work than merely joining 
two clauses together. It is important to note that Greek differs from English in the importance 
given to such particles. It is tempting for an English speaker to assume that the function o f such a 
word is purely syntactical, that such a word serves only to link two clauses together. But in fact parti­
cles o f this sort play a much more important role in conveying the sense of such a connection be­
tween clauses—not every pair of clauses is linked together in a purely conjunctive way, and that is 
why the word κα ί can be translated in such a wide variety o f ways: “and”, “even”, “also”, etc. Recall 
the text o f this passage, and consider the underlined portion (21a25-28):
ώσπερ "Ομηρός έστί τι, oîjov ποιητής* άρ’ οΰν κ α ι εστιν. ή οΰ: κατά  
συμβεβηκός γάρ κατηγορείται τό εστιν του Όμηρου* οτι γάρ ποιητής εστιν, 
άλλ’ ου καθ’ αυτό, κατηγορείται κατά  του Όμήρου το εστιν.
For example, Homer is something (say, a poet). Does it follow that he is? No, for 
the ‘is’ is predicated accidentally o f Homer; for it is because he is a poet, not in its 
own right, that the ‘is’ is predicated of Homer.
There are two points that anyone familiar with Aristotle’s Greek will recogiize immediately. First, 
the expression άρ’ ουν at the beginning of this question normally indicates an inference; second, 
the force of the word κα ί in the question άρ ουν κα ι εστιν, ή o b ... must surely be to emphasize 
the εστιν. I would render the first sentence of this passage as
Just as Homer is something, say a poet; can we infer from that (άρ’ ουν) that he also is 
(και εστιν) or not?
On Jacobs’ reading the word κα ί is not translated at all. I suppose that he might suggest that it be 
read as “can we infer from that that Homer also is a poet or not?” Yet the point o f the first part o f
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this sentence is that Homer actually is something, in this particular case we are asked to presume that 
he actually is a poet, so Jacobs would be reduced to saying that the passage means something like “If 
we presuppose that Homer is a poet, can we then infer that he is a poet, or not?”. Quite apart from 
the rather unsavory result o f attributing puzzlement to Aristotle over the validity o f a tautology, this 
reading has nothing to do with the broader context of the De interpretatione passage, which is about 
kinds of affirmations. To be fair, Jacobs is not ignorant o f this context; but it is curious that he 
chooses to ignore completely the καί, which seems to me to be crucial in understanding the thrust 
of the question. In particular, Jacobs’ reading leaves one wondering what is the point of the conclu­
sion of the chapter at 21a32-33:
τό δε μή ον, οτι δοξαστόν, ούκ αληθές ειπείν  ον τι* δόξα γάρ αύτοϋ ούκ
εστιν οτι εστιν, άλλ’ οτι ούκ εστιν.
It is not true to say that what is not, since it is thought about, is something that is;
for what is thought about it is not that it is, but that it is not.
Thinking about something, having a belief—a δόξα—about something, here seems to be classed as 
a kind of predication. But if what we are thinking about that something is that “ούκ εστιν”, “it is 
not”, we are not also thinking about it that “εστιν”, that “it is”.8 Clearly Aristotle is interested not 
in whether what is predicated is accidental or essential to the subject, but whether the conceptual 
information contained in the predicate can be broken down into constituent parts corresponding to 
the parts o f the linguistic expression o f the predicate to form new predications. I take this to be the 
crucial sense of this passage, and I will be returning to this point shortly.
We are again left wondering what it is that is supposed to motivate reading the present pas­
sage in any way other than the traditional way. The traditional reading does not conflict with any o f 
the surrounding text of De interpretaüone 21al8-34, which is about the problem of predicating 
something of a subject that, taken conceptually with what it is to be the subject, amounts to a con­
tradiction. For example, calling a dead man a man entails a contradiction for, in order to be a man 
one must be a living thing, but “dead man” does not indicate a living thing and cannot be truly 
predicated of a genuine man (indeed, the predicate “dead man” (τεθνεώτα άνθρωπον) is itself an 
oxymoron, on Aristotle’s account; presumably Aristotle means to say that the word “dead”, 
τεθνεώτα cannot be coherently linked with the word “man”, άνθρωπον, either as a subject or as 
part o f a complex predicate). Now if we are to be allowed to infer that “Homer is” from “Homer is 
a poet”, on Aristotle’s account, then we must be permitted to infer that “Homer is a poet” carries 
existential import. But Aristotle notes that the “is” of “Homer is a poet” cannot be understood 
apart from the remainder o f the predicate, i.e., it must be understood as a linguistic component o f 
the phrase “is a poet” and should not be taken in a metaphysical sense to be predicating existence 
simplidter o f him in addition to predicating being-a-poet of him. Indeed, he goes on immediately to 
say that “where predicates both contain no contrariety if definitions are put instead of names and 
are predicated in their own right and not accidentally, in these cases it will be true to speak o f the 
particular thing even without qualification”, and this appeal to intersubstitutivity appears to under­
score the fact that the predicates being considered have to be evaluated in terms o f what they mean\ 
it is not enough to pick a word from a true predicate and create a new predicate out of that word 
(by some sort of extended paronymy) and then claim that this new linguistic pastiche can also be 
truly predicated metaphysically o f the same subject (for example, we cannot take the true sentence
8 Cf. Metaphysics 1030a25-27.
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“Bill Clinton is president o f the United States” and claim that, because that sentence is true, it is 
also true to say: “Bill Clinton is the United States”).
It seems, then, that Jacobs has failed to defend Aristotle from the charge of inconsistency 
leveled at him by the received view. However, I would like to suggest a way out. My suggestion will 
not involve any quarrel with the received view’s method of translating these passages; instead I will 
be content to show that the De interpretations passage has nothing to do with existential import and 
cannot reasonably be taken to contradict the Categories passage, which has much to do with existen­
tial import.
It should be noted from the start that, whereas Aristotle explicitly says in the Categones pas­
sage that the sentences “Socrates is sick” and “Socrates is well” will both be false if there is no Soc­
rates, and that one o f them will be true and the other false if there is a Socrates, he says nothing 
about the truth or falsity of “Homer is a poet”, even though the received view takes him to be sup­
posing, for the purposes of the example, that “Homer is a poet” is true. Indeed, if the received view 
is correct, it is precisely this assumption (that “Homer is a poet” is true) that leads to the putative 
contradiction, for by introducing the notion o f truth and falsity the received view tacitly injecte the 
question o f existential import into the De interpretations passage in spite o f the fact that Aristotle 
himself has not mentioned it there. Our passage from the Categones is explicitly about how the exis­
tence or non-existence o f a subject affects the truth values o f pairs o f sentences that contain con­
tradictory predicates or predicates expressing possessions and privations or statements containing 
affirmations and denials. Our De interpretatione passage, however, has nothing to do with the exis­
tence of the subjects of predications, but rather is concerned with the admissibility o f various ways 
o f manipulating subjects and predicates: to the extent that the passage has to do with the proof- 
theoretical notion o f a putative rule of inference with respect to complex predicates, it is a passage 
that is about the syntax and semantics o f predicates and not about existential import.
The chapter can be divided into four closely related parte. In the first Aristotle notes that 
some complex predicates do not represent metaphysical unities and, hence, count as several asser­
tions if predicated of something that is a metaphysical unity. For example, “white” and “walking” 
are purely accidental properties when predicated o f a subject such as “Socrates”, so to say that 
“Socrates is a white walking thing” is really to make two assertions about Socrates: that he is white 
and that he is walking. But if a complex predicate does represent a metaphysical unity, then it can 
be asserted of a subject as a single assertion. For example, “animal”, “two-footed”, and “tame” are 
all parts of the essence of “human being”, and so the sentence “Socrates is a tame, two-footed ani­
mal” counts as a single assertion even though it has the same grammatical form as “Socrates is a 
white walking thing”.
In the second part Aristotle notes that some terms can be truly predicated both separately 
and together of some one thing, others cannot. For example if Socrates is a man and is white it is 
also true to say that he is a white man, and if he is a white man he is also white and a man; but if 
Socrates is good and he is a cobbler it is not necessarily true that he is a good cobbler, and if he is a 
good cobbler he is not necessarily good simpRdter, though he is a cobbler simplidter. This last point 
will be particularly important for our understanding of the Homer passage.
In the third section Aristotle offers two criteria to explain what he said in the first section. 
First of all, accidental attributes of something are not sufficient to constitute a metaphysical unity, 
nor are subaltérnate properties. For example, “white” and “sitting” are accidental properties o f a 
man, so ihey cannot constitute some metaphysical unity that can be predicated of a man with a 
single assertion; and “being a man” is subaltérnate to “being footed” and “being an animal”, so 
there is no metaphysical unity “being a footed man” or “being an animal man” that can be opposed 
to “being a non-footed man” or “being a non-animal man”.
Carson 9
The structure of the fourth section, which contains our Homer example, is rather complex. 
Aristotle begins by noting that it is always true to call a particular man a man, and a particular white 
man white. But “when in what is added some opposite is contained from which a contradiction 
follows” (21a21-22) such assertions will always be false. (It is important to note that Aristotle says 
“follows”, επεταί; this word indicates that the problem is one of inference.) For example, it is false 
to call a dead man a man because the concept of “man” contains the concept of “being a living 
thing” while the concept of “dead man” (if τεθνεώτα άνθρωπος,per impossibile, could count as a 
concept) contains the concept o f “not being a living thing”. The assertion “the dead man is a man” 
allows us to infer, by replacing names with definitions, that “the non-living thing is a living thing”, 
which is absurd. Now, the verb “to be” presents us with a special case, because it can be either ex­
istential or copulative. Aristotle claims that in a sentence like “Homer is a poet” the verb “to be” is 
playing a copulative role and is not predicating existence o f Homer. For this reason we may no t in­
fer “Homer exists” from “Homer is a poet”, because the word “is” in “Homer is a poet” serves a 
function analogous to the “is” in “Homer is running”, and we may not take apart a predicate like “is 
running” or “is a poet” and assert separately its constituent parts of a subject any more than we can 
assert “Brussells sprouts are good” on the grounds that “Brussells sprouts are good for you”. This is 
a point about the structure and semantic content o f the predicate and would be true regardless of 
the existence of the subject of the predication.9
We can contrast this final section of our chapter o f De interpretatione with the tenth chapter 
of the Categories by putting the matter this way. The Categories passage has to do with an entailment 
relation that holds of certain kinds of assertions, while the De interpretatione passage rejects a putative 
rule of inference for use with predicates containing the verb “to be” (and by extension makes a 
claim about the semantics of predicates generally). In the Categories Aristotle is implicitly saying that 
any sentence of the form “a is F ’ entails the sentence “a exists”; in the De interpretatione passage, on 
the other hand, Aristotle is concerned to show that there is no valid inferential move from a predi­
cate “is F ’ to an existential predicate “is” within the context of the semantic content o f the predi­
cate alone. In other words, “being F ’ differs in an essential way from “being simpääteC: it is the dif­
ference between the copulative and existential uses o f the verb είνα ι, and Aristotle quite rightly 
notes that we cannot extract “existence” as a predicate from another predicate whose linguistic ex­
pression contains only the word “is” as a syntactical connector linking a subject to a semantic predi­
cate.10 To allow such a move would be to allow a move from Fa to Ga, where F  and G represent 
different predicates; without some sort of axiom or theorem to allow such a move there is no com­
pelling reason to accept such an inference, and not only are there no compelling reasons to warrant 
such an axiom or theorem, Aristotle seems to be at pains to explain where there should be no such 
axiom or theorem.
9 If I understand him correctly, my interpretation is not inconsistent with that o f  Michael W edin, “Aristotle on the 
Existential Import o f Singular Sentences”, Phronesis 24 (1979) 179-196, but his view  is a syntactical one, whereas 
my view is that the semantic structure o f  the predicate is fondamental in blocking the inference. A ccording to 
what Wedin calls the “non-decom position” principle, the “is” o f  “Homer is a poet” is predicated accidentally 
(κατά συμβεβηκός) o f Homer and such predications may not be “detached” to form new  predications saka 
veritate (pp. 186-187).
10 On the question o f  the copulative and existential uses o f  the verb “to be” in  Greek see Charles H. Kahn , The 
Verb T e’ in Ancient Greek, Part 6 o f  John W. M. Verhaar, ed.. The Verb *Be’ and its Synonyms: Philosophical and 
Grammatical Studies, volum e 16 o f  Morris Halle et aL, edd.. Foundations of Language, Supplementary Series (D ordrecht D . 
Reidel 1973), “The Role o f nous in the Cognition o f  First Principles in Posterior Analytics I I 19”, in  Enrico Berti, ed., 
Aristotle on Science: The Posterior Analytics. Proceedings of the Fight Sympotium Aristotelicum (Padova: Editrice 
Antenore, 1981), and Lesley Brown, ‘T h e Verb ‘to be’ in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks”, in Stephen Everson, 
ed.. Companions to Anrient Thought 3: Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp. 212-236.
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So far nothing in my analysis would warrant drawing the conclusion that Aristotle has con­
tradicted himself- The received view goes too far in trying to tie the example from the De 
interpretaüone to the lesson o f the Categories', the existence o f Homer is not what is at issue. It is true 
enough that the sentence “Homer is a poet” entails “Homer exists”, but when Aristotle says that 
we may not infer “Homer exists” from “Homer is a poet” he is not saying that “Homer is a poet” 
does not entail “Homer exists”, he is saying that we may not decompose a complex predicate into 
its constituent parts if it contains a copulative “to be”, and in particular we may not convert a 
copulative “to be” into an existential “to be”. If  Aristotle had chosen a different example, one that 
did not involve the verb “to be”, the putative contradiction might never have been an issue, but it is 
precisely because o f the dual nature o f the verb “to be” that it seems a particularly natural example.
This fallacious conversion between the copulative and the existential uses o f the verb “to 
be” was a greater risk in the dialectical practices o f Aristotle’s day than in our own, because Greek 
had only the one verb for both meanings. In English we never say “Mary exists running”, and 
everyone knows that “Mary is running” is not semantically equivalent to “Mary exists running”. We 
might think that “Mary is running” entails “Mary exists” or we might not—but either way we know 
that you can’t replace, salva veritate (or even salva mente), the “is” o f “is running” with the definition 
o f “exists”, and this is precisely Aristotle’s point in our passage from the De interpretaüone.
Aristotle notes that the “is” in “Homer is a poet” is only predicated o f Homer by virtue of 
its being a part of the predicate “is a poet”; the “is” is not a genuine instance o f predication, but an 
accidental sort (κατά συμβεβηκός 21a26-27), by which he presumably means to say that the “is” 
in “Homer is a poet” is not, all by itself, actually predicating anything of Homer, but only insofar as 
it is connected to “poet”, thus completing the sense o f the predicate. In other words, Aristotle here 
draws a distinction between something that is a predicate in the primary sense o f that word, and 
something that is not a predicate in the primary sense, but rather is a predicate only in an accidental 
sense.11 This brings me to one final point about Jacobs’ reading o f our passages.
Jacobs rejects the idea that Aristotle here has in mind the difference between predicates that 
are predications essentially and predicates that are predications only accidentally; he claims that what 
Aristotle has in mind is instead the difference between predications of accidental and predications 
of essential properties. Being a poet, on Jacobs’ reading, is an accidental property that Homer has, 
while existing is an essential property. It seems to me that there are two problems with this view. 
First, it is not clear that Aristotle would have regarded existence as a property o f any sort, let alone 
o f an essential so rt Usually one thinks of predicates such as “man” or “animal” when one thinks of 
the essential properties o f a subject like Homer. An essential property is what makes a thing what it 
is, but existence is common to everything and does not count as a principle of differentiation.12 
“Homer is a man” or “Homer is a rational biped” predicate essential properties o f Homer, but 
“Homer exists” does not assert a property that can be used to tell us what it is to be Homer.
Second, Jacobs appears to be insisting that, because Aristotle speaks of accidental and essen­
tial predicates at 21a7-17, he must still be speaking about them in 21al8-33, but this is not at all 
clear.13 For one thing, Aristotle is not primarily concerned with accidental and essential predicates
11 Here I part company with W edin (182), who reads κατά  συμβεβηκός in a slightly different way: the “is” in 
‘H om er is a poet” attributes accidental being to Hom er, as opposed to καθ’ αί>τό being (Metapbytics Δ  7). I agree 
with W edin (186), contra Jacobs (see below ), that Aristotle is not concerned here with sentences that express κατά  
συμβεβηκός predications.
12 C£ Posterior Analytics 2.7 92bl3: “existence is not the essence o f  anything”.
13 In an appendix (p. 295), Jacobs makes the rather bold claim that “Aristotle never uses the expressions καθ’ 
α ύ τό /κ α τά  συμβεβηκός τό ον (and its cognates) to denote anything other than the difference between using 
“is” (and its cognates) to assert what is essential and what is accidental” (emphasis in the original). This seems to
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even in 21a7-17. It is true that he is talking about predicates that are accidentel in some way, but his 
point is that when they are combined in certain ways they are not predicates simplidter; because they 
no longer assert one thing of one thing.
An examination o f Postenor Analytics 1.22 83al5-17 supports reading the distinction being 
drawn here in the way I am suggesting. Aristotle says that predicating, say, “white” of “log” is predi­
cation simplidter, but predicating “white”, say, of “the musical” is either not predication at all 
(μηδαμώς κατηγορειν), or else predication only accidentally and not simplidter (κατηγορειν μέν 
μή απλώς, κατά συμβεβηκός δέ κατηγορειν). At the beginning of the passage in which he dis­
cusses the Homer sentences, Aristotle notes that his topic is predication simpddtervñúi respect to 
individuals (αληθές δ’ έστίν ειπειν  κατά  του τίνος κα ι απλώς, 21al8-19); and this after dis­
cussing predications involving complex predicates that are κατά  συμβεβηκός. The similarity of 
language and subject matter seems sufficient to warrant concluding that Aristotle does, in fact, have 
in mind here the distinction between predications simplidter and predications in a derivative sense, 
rather than the distinction between predications of accidental and essential properties.
To sum up, then: although Jacobs fails to rescue Aristotle from the putative contradiction 
of which he is accused by the received view, he can be saved nevertheless. He accepts existential 
import for singular subjects and disallows conversion o f a copulative “to be” into an existential “to 
be” on the grounds that there is no intersubstitutivity o f definition for the two uses o f the verb 
είνα ι, and this result can be generalized to any similarly complex predicate.
2. General Terms
So far we have considered only those sentences whose subjects are singular terms: I turn 
now to a consideration of Aristotle’s treatment o f non-referring general terms. We know from the 
Prior Analytics that, according to the Laws o f Subaltemation, universal statements have existential 
import (AaB entails AiB, AeB entails AoB), but he was aware that general terms could be non-de­
noting. His favorite example o f a non-denoting general term was τραγέλαφος, a combination o f 
the Greek words τράγος, he-goat, and ελαφος, deer, the compound usually being rendered into 
English as “goat-stag”.14 This particular general term presents a slightly different problem than does 
“Socrates” or “Homer”, since Aristotle believed that both Socrates and Homer had existed at some 
time even if they did not exist in his own time;15 but there had never been any goat-stags nor would 
there ever be. So no statement asserting properties o f goat-stags can be true according to the crite­
ria o f Categories 10. If no true assertions can be made about goat-stags, what can we possibly know 
about them? Does the word “goat-stag” have any meaning at all? At De interpretaúone 1 16al6-18 
Aristotle says:
κα ι γάρ ό τραγέλαφος σημαίνει τι, οΰπω δέ αληθές ή ψευδός, έάν τό ε ίνα ι 
ή μή είνα ι προστεθή ή άπλώς ή κατά  χρόνον.
For even “goat-stag” signifies something, but not yet something either true or false, 
unless “is” or “is not” be added, either simplidter or with respect to time.
fly in the face o f Posterior Analytics 1.22 83al-24, where there seems to be no other choice than to read the 
distinction as one between primary and derivative senses.
14 Aristotle did not coin the term: it is found in Aristophanes (Wasps 937) and Plato (Repubüc 488a).
15 See Physics 221b31-32.
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The word σημαίνειν sometimes been offered as the Greek equivalent o f the English “to mean”, 
but there are good reasons for being wary about accepting such an equivalence.16 The literal mean­
ing of the word is well established: it means “to show by means o f a sign, to indicate, to point out”. 
It is related to the noun σημειον, a “sign” or “token”. Smoke, according to Aristotle, is a σημεΐον 
o f fire; other writers speak o f similar relations: a trumpet-blast is the σημειον o f the beginning of 
battle, a signet-ring is a σημειον o f an oath, and tracks in the snow are σημεία of an animal’s 
proximity. If this is supposed to be Aristotle’s word for “meaning” then his notion o f meaning is 
very different from ours, for though smoke “means” fire, smoke does not, by itself, have meaning 
in our sense. And Aristotle himself is careful to restrict what he has to say about language to spoken 
sounds that are significant by convention: he does not suggest that smoke is a medium of commu­
nication that exists between a fire and a human observer. So this passage from the De interpretatione 
cannot be safely interpreted to be claiming that a word like “goat-stag” has “meaning” even though 
there are no goat-stags. So what is this passage claiming?
If we are to take the σημαίνει o f 16al7 quite literally, then the passage is claiming that the 
word “goat-stag” indicates something by means o f its status as a signifier. Aristotle is vague about 
what is signified: “goat-stag” σημαίνει τι, it “signifies somethin¿\ but he does not say what. We 
know that it cannot signify a real, particular goat-stag, the way “Socrates” or “Homer” signify real, 
particular men— i.e., “goat-stag” is not the name of an individual or a rigid designator. What, ex­
actly, does it signify? Perhaps it is meant to be like the word “man” or “horse”, a name o f a class.
For Aristotle, a class name signifies an essence: what it is to be a member o f the class. So the term 
“goat-stag”, if it were going to signify a class at all, ought to signify what it would be for something 
to be a member o f the class of goat-stags: it ought to signify το τφ  τραγελάφω είναι.
How do we know what it is to be a goat-stag? According to Aristotle, a definition can tell us 
what it is to be something. But definitions have a kind of existential import of their own: according 
to the Posterior Analytics (2.7) to know what something is, to know its scientific definition, presup­
poses the knowledge that it is. So we cannot come to know what it is to be a goat-stag by means of 
any process of scientific definition; indeed, there can be no scientific definitions of goat-stags if 
there are no goat-stags. Indeed, Aristotle here reiterates his claim about goat-stags from De 
interpretatione 1 (Posterior Analytics 2.1 92b 5-8):
τό γάρ μη ον ούδείς οϊδεν δ τ ι έστίν, άλλα  τ ί μέν σημαίνει ό λόγος ή το 
όνομα, όταν εϊπω τραγέλαφος, τί δ’ έστι τραγέλαφος αδύνατον είδέναι.
O f that which does not exist, no one knows what it is. You may know what the ac­
count or the name signifies when I say “goat-stag”, but it is impossible to know 
what a goat-stag is.
But we are still left wondering what it is, exactly, that the name “goat-stag” or its account (λόγος) 
could possibly signify, at least in Aristotle’s view. This is a question that falls outside o f the scope of 
this paper, so I will conclude with some remarks of a very general kind that I think will put this 
problem into the context of inference and semantics that I stressed in the first part o f the paper.
If we allow a term such as “goat-stag” to stand for a concept then we do not need to insist 
that the concept have a scientific definition associated with it—an informal or ostensive definition 
will suffice to give sense to the word λόγος in the Posterior Analytics passage above. An informal 
definition of “goat-stag” might include imaginings, standardized within the culture by means o f
16 For a treatment o f this problem, see Terence Irwin, “Aristotle’s Concept o f  Signification”, in Malcolm Schofield  
and Martha Craven Nussbaum, edd.. Language and Logos: Studies in Andent Greek Phibsophy Presented to G. E . L  Owen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 241-266.
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conventionalization, of what the offspring of a goat and a stag might look like. This sort o f λόγος 
will not tell you what it is to be a goat-stag, because "goat-stag” is not the name of a genuine, scien­
tific class and, hence, there is no such thing as what it is to be a goat-stag. However, it will enable 
you to understand sentences in which the word "goat-stag” is used if you are a member o f the same 
culture as the person with whom you are speaking. In this case, as the saying goes, meaning is use.
The language in De interpretations 1 is reminiscent o f Plato’s language of “interweaving” in 
Sophist 262f£; indeed, the same metaphor is used (συμπλοκή). Part o f the project of De 
interpretations seems to be to give an Aristotelian account o f how it is that subject terms combine 
with predicate terms to give rise to assertions about relations between metaphysical subjects and 
predicates,17 and on this score it seems that Aristotle is in agreement with Plato: false assertions are 
not meaningless because they can be understood in terms of the signification of their components. 
To assert that "Theaetetus flies” is false because, on Plato’s account, the entity picked out by the 
word "Theaetetus” cannot "interweave” with the Form denoted by the word "flies”, but (contra the 
Eleatics) the assertion is not meaningless because we understand what the two words refer to. Pre­
sumably a similar judgment could be made if Theaetetus did not exist: the assertion must be false 
(because there is nothing for the Form of flying to interweave with), but if the word “Theaetetus” 
has some use that has been agreed upon in the language community (it refers to a man who, when 
alive, was named "Theaetetus”), then the assertion is a meaningful one nonetheless. On this ac­
count assertions about goat-stags will have meaning because we understand the use o f the terms 
involved, but in attempting to "combine” the pseudo-concept o f a goat-stag with the concept of 
some genuine predicate (i.e., when we add "is” or "is not”), the assertion is rendered false, since 
there are no goat-stags for the predicates to combine with.
So even though Aristotle is not explicit about the existential import of sentences containing 
non-referring general terms, what he says about definition and essence makes it clear that his 
thinking about such terms was consistent with what he said explicitly about non-referring singular 
terms in the Categoner. any statement asserting properties of such terms will be false, suggesting that 
sentences containing assertions about general terms also carry existential import.
17 For an extended discussion o f this aspect o f the De interpretatione, see Whitaker, Aristotle’s D e interpretatione, pp. 
35-61.
